

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

JAVIER HERNANDEZ RIVERA,

Plaintiff,

V.

CIVIL NO. 03-1494 (RLA)

MUNICIPALITY OF AGUADILLA,

Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

The MUNICIPALITY OF AGUADILLA ("MUNICIPALITY"), the only remaining defendant in these proceedings, has moved the Court to dismiss the claims asserted by plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint (docket No. 47) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Fed. R. Civ. P. The Court having reviewed plaintiff's arguments in response thereto as well as the allegations in the aforementioned pleading hereby finds as follows.

Plaintiff instituted this action seeking damages and equitable relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e *et seq.* ("Title VII"), and various local statutory provisions.

In its motion the MUNICIPALITY initially argues that plaintiff has no valid § 1983 cause of action in that he has no actionable First Amendment or retaliation claim nor is there municipal

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3 liability. Additionally, defendant contends that the Title VII claim
4 may be time-barred, plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief and
5 that we should decline supplemental jurisdiction in this action.

6 **THE COMPLAINT**

7 The allegations in the complaint are straightforward and can be
8 summarized as follows.

9 Since approximately August 1997 plaintiff was employed as a
10 policeman by the MUNICIPALITY OF AGUADILLA with a satisfactory
11 performance.

12 In February 2002 plaintiff testified in proceedings at the Equal
13 Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") initiated by BLANCA
14 VALENTIN ALMEIDA, a female Aguadilla municipal police officer,
15 complaining of sexual discrimination and harassment at her workplace.

16 According to plaintiff, as a result of his participation in the
17 EEOC proceedings defendants put in place a retaliation plan aimed at
18 his eventual termination from employment. As part of the
19 aforementioned scheme, plaintiff's working conditions were changed
20 and he was routinely assigned duties involving greater hardship and
21 risks.

22 Eventually, on December 12, 2002 plaintiff was summarily
23 terminated from his position as a result of a selective accusation of
24 wrongdoing. Plaintiff further contends that his dismissal was an
25 unreasonable and disproportionate sanction and motivated by

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2 retaliatory animus based on his cooperation with the EEOC
3 investigation.

4 On April 27, 2003 the EEOC issued plaintiff a Notice of Right to
5 Sue letter.

6 The original complaint in this action was filed on May 6, 2003.

7 **RULE 12(b) (6)**

8 In disposing of motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6)
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. the Court will accept all factual allegations as true
10 and will make all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor.

11 Frazier v. Fairhaven School Com., 276 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 2002);
12 Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 267
13 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); Berezin v. Regency Sav. Bank, 234 F.3d
14 68, 70 (1st Cir. 2000); Tompkins v. United Healthcare of New England,
15 Inc., 203 F.3d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 2000).

16 Our scope of review under this provision is a narrow one.
17 Dismissal will only be granted if after having taken all well-pleaded
18 allegations in the complaint as true, the Court finds that plaintiff
19 is not entitled to relief under any theory. Brown v. Hot, Sexy and
20 Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 1995) cert. denied 116
21 S.Ct. 1044 (1996); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st
22 Cir. 1994). Further, our role is to examine the complaint to
23 determine whether plaintiff has adduced sufficient facts to state a
24 cognizable cause of action. Alternative Energy, 267 F.3d at 36. The
25 complaint will be dismissed if the court finds that under the facts
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2 as pleaded plaintiff may not prevail on any possible theory.
3 Berezin, 234 F.3d at 70; Tompkins, 203 F.3d at 93.
4

5 **SEC. 1983**

6 Defendant bases his request for dismissal of the § 1983 claim on
7 plaintiff's alleged failure to adequately plead either a First
8 Amendment or retaliation claim. Additionally, the MUNICIPALITY
9 argues that there is no municipal liability in this case.

10 Section 1983 reads:

11 Every person who, under color of any statute,
12 ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or
13 Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
14 of the United States or other person within the
15 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
16 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
17 laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
18 law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.

19 This provision does not create substantive rights but is rather
20 a procedural mechanism for enforcing constitutional or statutory
21 rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d
22 114 (1994). The statute, i.e., § 1983 "is not itself a source of
23 substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights
24 elsewhere conferred... by the United States Constitution and federal
25 statutes.'" Rodríguez García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91,
26 99 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3,

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2 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). See also, Local Union v.
3 Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Of course, § 1983
4 does not itself confer substantive federal rights; it simply provides
5 a remedy for their deprivation.") Hence, it is plaintiff's burden to
6 identify the particular underlying constitutional or statutory right
7 that is sought to be enforced via judicial proceedings.
8

9 In order to prevail in a § 1983 claim plaintiff must bring forth
10 evidence that (1) defendant acted "under color of state law" and
11 (2) he was deprived of a federally protected right. Rogan v. City of
12 Boston, 267 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2001); Dimarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238
13 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); Collins v. Nuzzo 244 F.3d 246 (1st cir.
14 2001); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.
15 1999).

16 Therefore, we must ascertain whether plaintiff has adequately
17 pled that he was deprived of any federally protected right as a
18 result of the events alleged in the complaint.
19

First Amendment

20 According to defendant, plaintiff's testimony before the EEOC
21 did not involve a matter of public concern in that plaintiff's speech
22 only addressed an individual's work situation. The MUNICIPALITY
23 further contends that the internal working conditions of a government
24 agency is not of inherent public interest.
25

26 "Claims for retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment
rights are cognizable under § 1983." Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1,

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3 16 (1st Cir. 2004). In order to establish a § 1983 claim premised on
4 a First Amendment violation a public employee must show that "(1) his
5 expression involved matters of public concern; (2) his interest in
6 commenting upon those matters outweighed the [MUNICIPALITY OF
7 AGUADILLA's] interests in the efficient performance of its public
8 services; and (3) his protected speech was a substantial or
9 motivating factor in the... adverse employment actions." Baron v.
10 Suffolk County Sheriff's Dept., 402 F.3d 225, 232 (1st Cir. 2005)
11 (citing Lewis v. City of Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 218 (1st Cir. 2003));
12 Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003).

13 Protection extends to communications both within and outside
14 work. See, Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 11 n.10 (1st
15 Cir. 2003) ("First Amendment protects employee speech about matters
16 of public concern even if the employee does not seek to make the
17 speech to an audience outside the workplace.")

18 Our initial inquiry is focused on whether plaintiff's testimony
19 before the EEOC in connection with sex discrimination and harassment
20 claims filed by a work colleague is a matter of public concern or is
21 merely one of plaintiff's personal interest as defendant contends.

22 "There are some situations where public interest will be
23 apparent from the content of the speech alone." Baron, 402 F.3d at
24 233. "On the other hand, public-employee speech on a topic which
25 would not necessarily qualify, *on the basis of its content alone*, as
26 a matter of inherent public concern (e.g., internal working

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2 conditions, affecting only the speaker and co-workers), may require
3 a more complete... analysis into the form and context of the public-
4 employee expression 'as revealed by the whole record,' with a view to
5 whether the community has in fact manifested a legitimate concern in
6 the internal workings of the particular agency or department of
7 government, and if so, whether the 'form' of the employee's
8 expression suggests a subjective intent to contribute to any such
9 public discourse." Baron, 402 F.3d at 233 citing O'Connor v.
10 Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 913-14 (1st Cir. 1993)).

11 The fact that the communication touches upon internal office
12 matters does not automatically preclude an inherent public interest
13 on the subject. See, i.e., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct.
14 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (item in questionnaire regarding possible
15 political pressure upon district attorneys found to be of public
16 interest in that government service should be based on merit and not
17 on political patronage); Baron (repeated complaints of harassment in
18 retaliation for reporting misconduct of prison officers implicated
19 public interest; it concerned actual wrongdoing and also affected
20 inmates).

21 Contrary to defendant's argument, we find that the situation
22 before us is imbued with public interest. Taking plaintiff's
23 allegations as true, he was terminated for having testified regarding
24 discriminatory conduct against a female fellow police officer. Not
25 only is sex discrimination specifically proscribed by federal and
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2 state law but the statutes themselves penalize reprisal against those
3 who venture in the defense of victims of discrimination. Protection
4 of witnesses validating claims of illegal discrimination is a matter
5 of both public policy and concern. This is particularly so in
6 situations involving police officers, such as the case before us,
7 where the reproachable conduct is precisely by those responsible for
8 enforcing the law. There is an inherent public concern in ensuring
9 not only that public employees feel free to testify at EEOC
10 proceedings without the fear of losing their jobs but also that
11 police officers abide by the law they have sworn to uphold.

12 Thus, there is no need to further inquire into the form and
13 content of plaintiff's speech.

14 **Retaliation Claim**

15 In the alternative, defendant claims that plaintiff's
16 retaliation claim should be dismissed because he was dismissed
17 subsequent to having charges filed against him and thus, he would
18 have been terminated regardless of his testimony. This argument is
19 not suited to a Rule 12(b) (6) procedure but rather would be grounds
20 for summary judgment or trial.

21 The same holds true for defendant's claim that plaintiff's
22 allegation that his permanent discharge was an "unreasonable and
23 disproportionate sanction" constitutes grounds for an administrative
24 claim and not civil rights violation.

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3 **MUNICIPAL LIABILITY**4 Defendant further argues that there can be no municipal
5 liability in this case because there is no underlying policy or
6 custom.7 As defendant correctly points out, the doctrine of *respondeat*
8 *superior* - whereby liability is imposed on employers for the acts or
9 omissions of their employees - is inapposite in actions brought under
10 § 1983. Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005);
11 Baron, 402 F.3d at 236. In order to hold the municipality accountable
12 plaintiff must present evidence that the damages complained of
13 resulted from the "execution of a [municipality's] policy or custom".
14 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56
15 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).16 [A] municipality cannot be held liable *solely* because
17 it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a
18 municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
19 *respondeat superior* theory. Rather, a municipality is
20 liable only when execution of a government's policy or
21 custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those edicts or
22 acts [that] may fairly be said to represent official
23 policy, inflicts the injury.24 Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 2005) (citations
25 and internal quotation marks omitted).

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However, high ranking municipal officers through their actions may establish the necessary policy to render the municipality liable under § 1983.

Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered... [P]articular officers may have authority to establish binding [city] policy respecting particular matters and to adjust that policy for the [city] in changing circumstances... We hold that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where - and only where - a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.

Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d at 59 (citing Penbaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-83, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)). See also, Baron, 402 F.3d at 236 ("In a § 1983 suit based on an official policy promulgated by officials with final policymaking authority, attribution to the municipality is easily established.")

Further, one sole action may be tantamount to municipal policy. "An unconstitutional policy... may be inferred from a single decision or act... [but] the isolated action must be taken by a municipal

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3 official with 'final policy-making authority' in the relevant area of
 4 the city's business." Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d at 59
 5 (citing Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir. 1996)).
 6 It is plaintiff's burden to establish that a particular officer had
 7 the necessary authority to set the municipal policy at issue. Wilson
 8 v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d at 60.

9 Pursuant to municipal law the AGUADILLA Mayor had the authority
 10 to hire and fire municipal employees¹ and also held the highest
 11 supervisory authority over the municipal police.² Therefore, making
 12 all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor in accordance with
 13 Rule 12(b) (6) we find that the complaint sufficiently pled municipal
 14 liability for purposes of § 1983. See, i.e., "[Mayor] had the
 15 authority to control the conditions of [plaintiff's] employment by
 16 virtue of being the Mayor... The employment decisions he made in
 17 that capacity constituted the policy of the municipality under well-
 18 established precedent." Rivera-Torres, 341 F.3d at 104.

19 **TIMELINESS OF TITLE VII**

20 It appearing that plaintiff filed his EEOC claim and the initial
 21 complaint within the limitations established in Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
 22 § e(5) (1), we conclude that this action was timely filed.

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25 ¹ See, 21 P.R. Laws Ann. § 4109(o) (2005).

26 ² See, 21 P.R. Laws Ann. § 1064 (2005).

3 **EQUITABLE RELIEF**4 Defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement
5 because he has not pled a due process violation. This argument is
6 without merit.7 Equitable relief, including reinstatement, is available under
8 both Title VII,³ and § 1983.⁴ Whether or not plaintiff will be
9 entitled to reinstatement in this case must be decided at a later
10 stage. Equitable relief is reserved for the court's discretion. See,
11 Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 43 (1st Cir. 2003) (it
12 is within the "district court's discretion to fashion an equitable
13 remedy"); Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d at 428 (discussing
14 factors to be taken into consideration by the court); Tejada-Batista
15 v. Fuentes-Agostini, 263 F.Supp.2d 321, 324 (D.P.R. 2001) (court must
16 apply its discretion in determining whether reinstatement is
17 appropriate.)18
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20 ³ See, Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 43 (1st Cir.
21 2003) (plaintiffs in Title VII employment discrimination suits
22 entitled to equitable remedies); Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 104
F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The remedial scheme in Title VII is
designed to make a plaintiff who has been the victim of
discrimination whole through the use of equitable remedies.")23 ⁴ See, Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 428-29 (1st
24 Cir. 1993) (reappointment one of the remedies available for
25 termination due to First Amendment discrimination); Bullen v.
26 Chaffinch, 336 F. Supp.2d 357, 359 (D.Del. 2004) (reinstatement
"preferred remedy to compensate an aggrieved party for loss of future
earnings as a result of illegal, adverse employment actions,
including actions that violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983").

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3 **SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION**

4 The court having denied defendant's request to dismiss the
5 federal claims, there is no reason for the court not to entertain the
6 local claims included in the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337.

7 **CONCLUSION**

8 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (docket No. 63)⁵ is **DENIED**.

9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 23rd day of November, 2005.

11 S/Raymond L. Acosta

12 RAYMOND L. ACOSTA
13 United States District Judge

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26 ⁵ See, Plaintiff's Opposition (docket No. 71).